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Macrocognition describes the way cognition occurs in naturalistic, or real-world, 
decision-making events and comprises the mental activities that must be successfully 
accomplished to perform a task or achieve a goal. The emphasis in macrocognition is 
on the cognitive functions performed during collaborative team problem solving and 
how teams can perform them. For this research we employed an empirical process for 
evaluating a model of team collaboration by analyzing and coding transcripts or chat 
logs that transpired during several real-world problem-solving events. Team 
communications that transpired when teams collaborated to solve complex problem-
solving tasks from two decision-making domains were analyzed and coded using the 
definitions of the macrocognitive processes in the model of team collaboration. Two 
coders coded each set of data and then reviewed their coding with one of the authors 
and discussed any differences in interpreting the definitions. Kappa Cohen, an inter-
rater reliability score, indicated high levels of agreement between coders for both sets 
of data. Consistent with our previous research we found that problem solving by these 
teams comprised a series of decisions. That is, decisions were made iteratively 
throughout the entire problem situation as opposed to problem solving culminating in 
team members agreeing on one big final decision.  
 
Macrocognition is an emerging field within the area of cognitive engineering that describes the 
way cognition occurs in naturalistic, or real-world, decision-making events (Cacciabue & 
Hollnagell, 1995). When studying macrocognition, the focus is on the mental activities that must 
be successfully accomplished to perform a task or achieve a goal (Klein, Ross, Moon, Klein, 
Hoffman, & Hollnagel, 2003). These cognitive functions are generally performed during 
collaborative team problem solving, where the emphasis is on building new knowledge. 
Macrocognition is differentiated from microcognition in several ways. Microcognition places an 
emphasis on experimental control of tasks and theoretical accounts of specific phenomena while 
macrocognition emphasizes cognition and performance under actual working conditions. 
Macrocognitive phenomena generally occur over longer time periods, involve unstructured tasks, 
and do not focus on the “basic” cognitive functions of microcognition (e.g., attention and 
memory).  
Macrocognition encompasses cognitive processes involved in detecting problems, developing 
and sharing situation awareness, generating options, using analogues, mentally simulating 
courses of action, planning and re-planning, maintaining vigilance, and assessing risk (Klein, 
2001). Several groups of researchers maintain that research on macrocognition is needed to 
better understand the cognitive functions employed by teams when they collaborate to solve 
challenging, information-rich, time-compressed problems (Klein et al, 2003; Fiore, Smith & 
Letsky, 2008; Letsky & Warner, 2008). This understanding can then be applied to improve the 
cognitive engineering of future systems.   
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One goal for studying macrocognition is to understand the complexity entailed in inter- and 
intra-individual cognition. For the research reported in this paper, we focus on cognition in 
problem-solving teams who collaborate while performing real-world tasks, in line with the view 
of macrocognition that seeks to describe cognitive work as it naturally occurs (Klein et al, 2003). 
We seek to better understand how cognition emerges in problem-solving teams engaging in tasks 
involving short-term situations which require rapid action to be taken towards specific mission 
goals. Macrocognition is defined, for this research, as the internalized and externalized high-
level mental processes employed by teams to create new knowledge during complex, one-of-a 
kind, collaborative problem solving (Burke, 2007; Letsky, Warner, Fiore, Rosen, Salas, 2007). 
High-level mental processes refer to the cognitive processes involved in combining, visualizing, 
and aggregating information to resolve ambiguity in support of the discovery of new knowledge 
and relationships.  
Internalized processes, that is, processes occurring inside the head, are those higher-level mental 
[cognitive] processes that are not expressed externally (e.g., writing, speaking, gesture), and can 
only be measured indirectly via qualitative metrics (e.g., questionnaires, cognitive mapping, 
think aloud protocols, multi-dimensional scaling, etc.), or surrogate quantitative metrics (e.g., 
pupil size, galvanic skin response). These processes can become either fully or partially 
externalized when they are expressed in a form that relates to other individual’s reference/ 
interpretation systems (e.g., language, icons, gestures, boundary objects (Letsky et al., 2007).   
Externalized processes (processes occurring outside the head) are those higher-level mental 
[cognitive] processes that occur at the individual or team level, and which are associated only 
with actions that are observable and measureable in a consistent, reliable, repeatable manner, or 
through the conventions of the subject domain have standardized meanings (Letsky et al, 2007).   
The framework of collaborative problem solving developed as part of the Office of Naval 
Research Collaboration and Knowledge Integration (CKI) Program (Letsky, Warner, Fiore, & 
Salas, 2007; Warner, Letsky, & Cowen, 2005) provides the conceptual foundation for this 
research. The emphasis on macrocognition in teams was initiated as part of a larger issue of how 
to understand and facilitate complex, collaborative activity – specifically in quick-response ad 
hoc teams. Both commercial and military communities are evolving in response to an increased 
reliance on socio-technical systems, globalization, and ubiquitous information accessibility; a 
development which leads to changes in the dynamics of team activity (Letsky & Warner, 2008). 
The CKI program seeks to develop a better understanding of internalized, non-quantifiable, 
mental processes at work as teams collect, filter, process and share information for problem-
solving purposes.  
The objective of the CKI program is to respond to emerging needs in both the military and 
business environments to better understand and improve the effectiveness of team decision 
making in complex, data-rich situations. As part of this effort, a model of team collaboration was 
developed that emphasizes the cognitive aspects of team collaboration and includes the major 
human decision-making processes used during team collaboration (Warner, Letsky & Cowen, 
2005).  The long-range program objective is to develop cognitive science-based tools, models, 
computational methods, and human-agent interfaces to help attain common situation awareness 
among distributed team members, engaged in asynchronous, quick-response collaboration for 
issue resolution, or decision making. 
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The goal for the research reported here is to understand the role of cognition in teams who are 
collaborating to solve challenging, dynamic, experienced-based, knowledge intensive, 
ambiguous problems. Our objectives are (1) to empirically evaluate a model of team 
collaboration (Letsky et al., 2007) by analyzing the macrocognitive processes used by teams 
during real-world complex decision-making events, (2) to refine the model as necessary, and (3) 
as a result of our analysis to develop a better understanding of the cognitive processes involved 
in team collaboration.  
Team Collaboration 
Many definitions of collaboration are found in the different bodies of research literature (see 
Wood and Gray, 1991). At the most fundamental level, collaboration refers to the joint effort of 
two or more agents to achieve a common goal where collaborating members construct judgments 
and then act on these judgments (Nosek, 2004). A definition more aligned with the research 
reported here states that collaboration occurs “when a group of autonomous stakeholders of a 
problem domain engage in an interactive process, using shared rules, norms, and structures, to 
act or decide on issues related to that domain” (Wood & Gray, 1991, p.11). This interactive 
process is performed in a collaborative team environment, with collaborative defined as the 
“cognitive aspects of joint analysis or problem solving for the purpose of attaining shared 
understanding sufficient to achieve situational awareness for decision making or creation of a 
product” (Letsky & Warner, 2008, p. 4). Collaboration provides increased information 
processing capacity where more minds are enlisted to handle complex problems (Hocevar, 
Thomas, & Jansen, 2006). Team members offer several perspectives on an issue for generating, 
choosing, and implementing action plans. A collaborative approach also ensures greater 
flexibility and innovation in situations where human judgment and experience are leveraged 
(Hocevar, et al, 2006.)   
 
In this paper, we examine team collaboration in three distinct task domains involving two tasks 
we label “execution” tasks and one planning task:  an air operations center exercise that involved 
time-sensitive targeting, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) collaborating with the 
Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) on Sept 11, 2001, and a planning task for UAV 
utilization.  
 
Decision Making  
 
A decision can be defined as a “mental event that occurs at a singular point in time…that leads 
immediately or directly to action” [italics added] (Hoffman & Yates, 2005, p. 77).  From this 
perspective, a decision is a commitment to a course of action. Other researchers view decision 
making as a macrocognitive process that both supports and is supported by deciding (Klein, 
Ross, Moon, Klein, Hoffman, & Hollnagel, 2003).  A complex problem-solving situation 
typically entails many decisions. These decisions include implementing actions in response to 
prior conditions or to the existing situation. As a situation unfolds, it will likely present new 
events requiring a decision.  
 
Dynamic Decision-Making Tasks 
 
Dynamic decision-making tasks, such as the decision domains investigated for this research, are 
characterized by situations where: (1) A series of decisions is needed, that is, the problem-
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solving event comprises many decisions to effectively deal with the problem as it unfolds. (2) 
Decisions are not independent because current decisions are constrained by earlier decisions, 
and, in turn constrain later ones. (3) The problem state changes during the decision process both 
autonomously – as the situation continues to unfold, and as a consequence of the decision-
maker’s actions. (4) Decisions are made in real time (Brehmer, 1992).  It is necessary for the 
practitioner to consider how the current decision will solve the immediate problem, as well as 
how it will impact future aspects of the overall problem-solving task. More importantly, it is not 
sufficient to make correct decisions “in the correct order, they also need to be made at the correct 
moment in time” (Brehmer, 1992, p. 16). Dynamic decision making situations are inherently 
stressful in part because the decision maker cannot control when these critical decisions have to 
be made.    
 
Dynamic decision making tasks are found across the spectrum of problem solving domains, 
including process control plants, patient management in hospitals, managing a business, and 
fighting a battle. Two of the tasks we examined were dynamic decision-making tasks, and one 
was a planning task. Our objective was to compare the team collaboration that is entailed in a 
planning task versus a dynamic decision-making or execution task to see if differences exist in 
the macrocognitive processes used by teams engaged in two different types of tasks, that is, 
planning versus execution. 
 
Implementing the decision often shapes both the problem as well as the cognitive process 
involved in decision making. An example from air warfare would be where the tactical action 
officer (TAO) recommended issuing a verbal warning to an aircraft in the vicinity of the ship in 
an effort to obtain additional information on the possible intent of the aircraft. However, in one 
particular case, the more experienced commanding officer (CO) negated that recommended 
action because, as he put it, “we don’t want to do that because, he may not even see us here in 
this confined area and that may just serve as a flag to the pilot – there is a U.S. Navy warship.” In 
this case the CO was thinking ahead to how a decision would impact the future situation. This 
represents an example of anticipatory thinking (Klein, Snowden, & Pin, 2007).  
 
By implementing a decision, and obtaining feedback on its results, the operator has changed the 
problem. For example, taking an action against an inbound aircraft, during an air warfare 
scenario aboard a US Navy ship, and observing that aircraft’s response, or lack of response to 
that action, will recast the problem, or change the practitioner’s mental model of that task, in 
terms of determining the intent of the aircraft. In a similar vein, during a Coast Guard maritime 
interdiction operation (MIO), collecting new information by obtaining the results of analysis of 
radiological data will move the boarding officer’s assessment of the type of cargo further along 
toward a resolution of the problem (that is, identifying the type of cargo and what type of 
response is required).  
A team can be defined as a “small group of people with complementary skills who are 
committed to a common purpose, performance goals, and approach for which they hold 
themselves mutually accountable” (Katzenbach & Smith, 1993, p. 45). 
 
Model of Team Collaboration 
 
In this paper we report on research conducted to empirically evaluate and, if necessary, refine a 
model of team collaboration developed by Fiore, Smith-Jentsch, Salas, Warner, & Letsky (in 
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press), depicted in Figure 1. The model was developed to describe the dimensions of macrocog-
nition where the emphasis is to describe these processes in a measurement framework and 
includes collaborative stages that the team goes through during the problem-solving task, the 
cognitive processes used by the team, and final outputs, such as the selected course of action. The 





Figure 1.  Model of Team Collaboration (from Fiore, et al, in press). 
 
Table 1 includes descriptions of the macrocognitive processes included in this model of team 
collaboration, developed by Fiore, et al (in press). Examples of chat log entries from an air 
operations center scenario coded as macrocognitive processes included in the model of team 
collaboration are also included in Table 1. Internalized team knowledge refers to the collective 
current knowledge held in the individual minds of team members.  Individual knowledge 
building refers to actions taken by individuals to build their own knowledge. Team knowledge 
building is a process that includes actions by teammates to disseminate information and 
transform information into actionable knowledge. Externalized team knowledge refers to the 
current knowledge overtly expressed to other team members through communication and/or 
artifacts during collaborative team problem solving. Team problem solving outcomes are 




Definitions of the macrocognitive process categories developed by Fiore et al (in press) were 
used to code team members’ communications. The first task domain we analyzed was the 
distributed team collaborative communications between two federal agencies: the team at the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), the 
regional headquarters for the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) 
responding to the events on Sept. 11, 2001. The second set of communications data was the Chat 
logs from an Air Force research event in the Air and Space Operations Center Dynamic Effects 
Cell. The third was the Chat logs from an experiment involving planning for unmanned autono-
mous vehicle (UAV) utilization. These domains were selected because they present the types of 
complex collaborative problem-solving scenarios the model seeks to explain. In the first two 
problem-solving tasks, developing and maintaining situation awareness was particularly difficult 
due to time pressure, high workload, incomplete or ambiguous information, and the knowledge-
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intensive nature of the task. Moreover, many military tasks require several geographically 
separated personnel to quickly form a cohesive team, where the team must be able to effectively 
share and process data, information, and knowledge to facilitate rapid decision making.   
Table 1. Macrocognitive Process Definitions and Examples from Air Operations Data.1  
 
 
Stage I: Internalized Team Knowledge Process:  Refers to the collective knowledge held in the individual 
minds of team members.  Internalized Team Knowledge is measured by eliciting it from individual team 
members using methods such as card sorting, concept mapping, paired comparison ratings, scenario probes.   
 
 
Team Knowledge Similarity:  Team knowledge similarity can involve the degree to which differing 
roles understand one another (e.g., how well a land/sea vehicle specialist understands a humanitarian 
specialist), or how well the team members’ understand the critical goals and locations of important 
resources (shared situation awareness).   




Team Knowledge Resources:  Team members’ collective understanding of responsibilities and resources 
associated with the task.   
 I remember sketchy authentication codes 
 Fighter aircraft #2 is out of position, looks like other strike assets are quicker  




Stage II:  Individual Knowledge Building Process:  is a process which includes actions taken by individuals in 
order to build their own knowledge. These processes can take place inside the head (e.g., reading, mentally 




Individual Information Gathering:  Individual information gathering involves actions individuals 
engage in to add to their existing knowledge such as reading, asking questions, accessing displays, etc.  
 What is the correct way to pass tasking to a predator to attack? 
 Joint coordinating elements do you know the local threat/ risk in the area and do you have 
imagery of the locations? 




Individual Information Synthesis:  Individual information synthesis involves comparing relationships 
among information, context, and artifacts to develop actionable knowledge. 
 Reliable sources report a known country bomb component supplier is 
 Awaiting a large shipment of explosives- It is suspected that a certain country uses this location 





Knowledge Object Development:  Knowledge object development involves creation of cognitive 
artifacts that represent actionable knowledge for the task. 
-      No coded examples for AOC data 
 
 
Stage III: Team Knowledge Building Process:  is a process which includes actions taken by teammates to 
disseminate information and to transform that information into actionable knowledge for team members.  
 
Team Information Exchange: Team information exchange involves passing relevant information to the 
appropriate teammates at the appropriate times.  
 Target priority coordinated, entered and pushed to joint time sensitive targeting manager 
 The actual snatch and grab would be possibility for special operation force (SOF) but we would 
        need intelligence assistance 
 For your information, this area is now under SOF control. Reconnaissance aircraft to provide 




Team Knowledge Sharing: Team knowledge sharing involves explanations and interpretations shared 
between team members or with the team as a whole.    
 Self defense applies for hostile acts from one country airspace to another 
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 Enemy forces that employ ordnance, electronic attack or achieve a radar lock against friendly 
               forces have committed a hostile act.      
 
 
Team Solution Option Generation:  Team solution option generation describes offering potential 
solutions to a problem. 
 Awaiting radiological impact assessment on watershed if strike building. Second option in work 
is destroy local roads to prevent access in/out. 
 If we crater the runway and taxiways, we may be able to effectively stop the target. 






Team Evaluation and Negotiation of Alternatives:  Team evaluation and negotiation of alternatives 
describes clarifying and discussing the pros and cons of potential solution options.  
 Just throwing this out there, but if you target the roadways, is there a chance you could spook  




Stage IV: Externalized Team Knowledge Process:  Refers to facts, relationships, and concepts that have been 
explicitly agreed upon, or not openly challenged or disagreed upon, by factions of the team.   
 
 
Externalized Cue-strategy Associations: Externalized cue-strategy associations describe the team’s 
collective agreement as to their task strategies and the situational cues that modify those strategies (and 
how).  
 The dynamic effects cell chief stated that if there is an erect launcher in a  joint  special  
       operations area the "rule of engagement” is to kill it as soon as possible and if there is time to  
       de-conflict with the teams 
 He mentioned tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM) wouldn't be de-conflicted either, but I 
dispute that logic. First, we wouldn't use a TLAM  shot to kill a launcher 
 I don't think. Unless it was a last resort. 
 Can get special operation force team to location as additional resource if we elect to monitor  
        the site for any potential leadership meetings that may occur later 
 
Pattern Recognition and Trend Analysis: Pattern recognition and trend analysis is the accuracy of the 
patterns or trends explicitly noted by members of a team that is either agreed upon or unchallenged by 
other team members.  
 Looks like this target may be similar to our first target with regards to unknown presence of  
              radiological containers in facility.  We would look at interdiction for containment to prevent 




Uncertainty Resolution:  Uncertainty resolution is the degree to which a team has collectively agreed 
upon the status of problem variables (e.g., hostile/friendly).  
 Tomahawk land attack missile most definitely have to be de-conflicted even for over flight of the 




Stage V: Team Problem Solving Outcomes:  Are assessments of quality relating to a team’s problem solutions 
or plan.  
 
Quality of Plan:  Quality of plan (problem solving solution) involves the degree to which the solution 
adopted by a problem solving team achieves a resolution to the problem (e.g., limit fatalities, limit 
destruction). 
-    No coded examples for AOC data 
 
 
Efficiency of Planning Process:  Efficiency of planning process describes the amount of time it takes a 
problem solving team to arrive at a successful resolution to a problem.   
-    No coded examples for AOC data 
 
 
Efficiency of Plan Execution:  Efficiency of plan execution describes the quality of the plan (e.g., 
number of lives saved) divided by the amount of resources used to accomplish this and the amount of 
time the plan takes to unfold. 
-    No coded examples for AOC data 
1(Definitions of macrocognitive processes from Fiore et al., in press.) 
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Task Domain I:  Federal Aviation Administration and Northeast Air Defense Sector  
On Sept 11, 2001, defense of the U.S. airspace depended on close interaction between two 
federal agencies: the team at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Northeast Air 
Defense Sector (NEADS), the regional headquarters for the North American Aerospace Defense 
Command (NORAD). NEADS was the key command and control (C2) center for the U.S. 
military response during the terrorist attacks.  
Task. The airspace of the continental US is monitored and protected by two main entities: the 
FAA, who is charged with navigating and controlling air traffic, and NORAD, who is charged 
with protecting the North American continent against air attack. In discharging its 
responsibilities, NORAD utilizes the airspace that is monitored by the FAA and must conduct 
their operations according to FAA regulations and with their active participation (Memorandum 
of understanding between FAA and NORAD, 1987).  Thus, close coordination between the FAA 
and NORAD is required in order to maintain safety of the U.S. airspace.  
 
Task Domain II:  Air and Space Operations Center  
A high-fidelity research event was conducted with Air Force personnel in the Air and Space 
Operations Center Dynamic Effects Cell. Dynamic targeting is a means by which coalition forces 
could possibly respond to the employment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and insurgent 
network leadership located within Afghanistan and Iraq. Due to their short time-sensitive nature, 
dynamic targets are normally vetted quickly and accurately through the targeting cycle. This 
process allows the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) to task available assets or 
reassign assets to engage and destroy known targets or other potential threats at a moment’s 
notice. The limited time window available for target engagement and destruction means that 
coalition forces must be prepared to apply timely and accurate measures and counter-measures 
against the enemy.   
 
Participants. Thirty-six key operational command and control military and civilian personnel 
from all services participated in the dynamic targeting exercise. Participants included personnel 
from the Air Force Warfare Center, Naval Strike Air Warfare Center, Special Operations 
Command, and United States Army (Air Force Research Laboratory Warfighter Readiness 
Division, 2008). The purpose was to assess tactics, techniques and procedures of operational 
command personnel performing kinetic and non-kinetic dynamic targeting in a highly 
asymmetric environment. The research event was a simulation of a 12-hour overnight shift in the 
dynamic effect cells of a typical air operations center (AOC). Communication between the 
various players was facilitated by the use of the Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination 
System (JADOCS). JADOCS provides the warfighter with a timely, accurate, detailed 
battlespace view for planning, coordination, and execution of targets. It is a joint mission 
management software application that provides a suite of tools and interfaces for horizontal and 
vertical integration across battlespace functional areas (Raytheon Company, 2008).  
Communications were recorded across fourteen different chat room channels.  
 
Task. Each of the operational players had varied access and responsibilities in the chat rooms 
used for the exercise. All players did not have access to every individual chat room; some key 
operational players were designated as room owner, active participant and/or observer. The 
allocation of assets to destroy key enemy leadership, suppression of enemy air defense systems, 
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convoy protection, close air support, and dynamic targeting are just a few of many ways by 
which the JFACC could use the assigned assets to render an adversary’s method of attack 
ineffective and thereby minimize damage and coalition force and civilian casualties. 
 
UAV Planning Task. Chat logs from a laboratory experiment were coded to provide a set of 
comparison data for a planning task. Three college students served as participants and were 
trained to engage in an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) simulation task where the task was to 
control their UAVs to obtain photos of assigned sites.  
Coding of Team Communications 
Communications between the FAA and NEADS teams were captured as audio recordings and 
subsequently transcribed. The audio from one of the primary communications channels used by 
the mission control commander (MCC), channel three – MCC Operations, was professionally 
transcribed. The resulting transcript provides a realistic example of an inter-agency collaborative 
team’s response to a real-world emergency. Chat logs were used from the AOC exercise. Two 
graduate students coded the FAA/NEADS data and another pair of graduate students coded the 
AOC data to establish the reliability of our coding method. Subsequently, one of the authors 
coded the team communications in the chat log from the UAV planning experiment.  
To determine the overall percentage of agreement between the two coders, the qualitative 
categorical statistic Cohen’s Kappa was used. An additional code was created called the Extra 
Code Filler (ECF) which was used to indicate where one coder did not specify a separate code 
for an utterance. This was necessary to ensure that each coder assigned the exact same number of 
total codes in order to accurately calculate inter-rater reliability for the two coders, using 
Cohen’s Kappa coefficient.  Cohen’s Kappa is the preferred statistic over the Chi-square statistic 
as kappa tests for agreement whereas Chi-square tests for association (Thomas, & Hersen, 2003). 
Cohen’s Kappa accounts for and factors into the calculation that each coder may also agree by 
chance and not strictly because they chose the same selection option or code. 
Communications were segmented into utterances; that is, elliptic or sentential constructions that 
referred to a distinct macrocognitive process.  Each utterance was typically given a separate 
code; however, in some instances two utterances referred to the same cognitive process and 
were thus grouped under one code. One week prior to coding the FAA/NEADS and the AOC 
communications, two raters coded team communications data from a maritime interdiction operation 
exercise not included in the present data set. Raters discussed their respective coding with one of the 
authors to calibrate their use of the macrocognitive process categories. Following this training period 
they independently coded the FAA/NEADS transcript and the AOC Chat logs, subsequently reviewed 
their coding, calculated percent agreement, and resolved any differences in coding.  
Inter-Rater Reliability.  A pair of coders coded 2,493 and 2,278 utterances for the AOC and 
FAA/ NEADS data, respectively. Inter-rater agreement was 89.32% and 77%, for the AOC and 




Consistent with naturalistic decision making research (e.g., Fischer, Orasanu, & Montalvo, 1993; 
Klein, 1989; 1993; Mosier 1991; Orasanu & Connolly, 1993; Rasmussen, 1993) we found that 
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problem solving by the FAA and NEADS on Sept 11, 2001, the air operations center dynamic 
targeting scenario, and the UAV planning tasks comprised a series of decisions. The most 
significant finding is that a new macrocognitive process emerged during the coding process to 
account for team communications/ chat log entries where a team member made a Decision to 
Take Action (DTA): A team member either issued an order for a course of action (COA) or 
make a request for a team member to do something (that is, request take action). These two types 
of decisions are differentiated by the authority relationship between the speaker and receiver and 
the criticality of the action to be taken. A course of action is issued by a superior to a subordinate 
and the action to be implemented is more critical to the outcome of the scenario. Requesting a 
peer to take action involves a lower level type of decision in terms of the authority relationship, 
that is, peer-to-peer, and the less critical nature of the action to the outcome of the scenario. 
 
Initially we did not anticipate team members involved in the UAV planning task to make the 
same types of decisions that required immediate action.  However, although this was labeled a 
planning task it actually involved dynamic planning and re-planning while the participants were 
performing their tasks involved in navigating their UAV to obtain photos of designated sites. 
Decisions were made iteratively throughout the entire problem situation for the two tasks that we 
label “execution,” or dynamic decision making tasks as well as, to a lesser degree, for the 
dynamic UAV planning task. This UAV task also entailed execution of the task.  The 
participants were engaged in “on-the-fly” planning based on directions from experimenters 
regarding which target to photograph next. This dynamic planning and execution task is distinct 
from a strictly planning task that culminates in team members agreeing on one big final decision 
(i.e., the plan) that is typical of a planning task. Based on these findings, we recommend the 
Fiore, Smith-Jentsch, Salas, Warner, and Letsky (in press) model of team collaboration be 
revised to include a new category: Decision to take action.  
Table 2 presents the results of the coding of three tasks: two execution tasks and one planning 
task. Coders used additional categories to code the team communications for all three task 
domains; these include administrative, miscellaneous and extra code filler (ECF). While speech 
turns coded as administrative and miscellaneous contribute to effective, closed-loop commun-
ications they do not represent a cognitive process and were thus removed for this analysis. Extra 
code filler was a coding that was added to utterances where one coder had not coded an utterance 
and the other coded had to ensure an equal number of codes between the two coders.  
 
Table 2 includes the percentages of the macrocognitive processes used when the administrative, 
miscellaneous, and ECF codes were removed from the calculations. Team Information 
Exchange, 51.5, 52.9, and 58 percent, respectively for the AOC, NORAD, and UAV data, and 
Individual Information Gathering, 21.9, 30.9, and 32.6 percent, for the AOC, NORAD, and UAV 
data, had the highest usage. In general, the large number of utterances/ chat log entries coded as 
Team Information Exchange and Individual Information Gathering indicate the huge emphasis 
on knowledge construction that is required at both the individual and team level for all three 
tasks. Decision to Take Action (a combination of Course of Action and Request Take Action 
codes) encompasses 10.3, 5.5, and 4.3 percent, respectively for the AOC, NORAD, and UAV 
data. Team Knowledge Sharing, the fourth highest used macrocognitive process was used 10.3, 
3.7, and 4.3 percent, respectively.  
Individual Knowledge Building involves actions taken at the intra-individual level for the 
purpose of building one’s own knowledge. This may involve reading task relevant content, 
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therefore, taking place in the head of the individual, or it may involve interactions with a system 
such as accessing a screenshot. These actions are hypothesized to involve Individual Information 
Gathering, Individual Information Synthesis, and Knowledge Object Development. These 
processes involve a number of activities ranging from reading, to question asking, to accessing 
displays. It is noteworthy that the vast majority of the communications coded as Individual 
Information Gathering involved instances of a team member asking a question. We interpret this 
as an indication of the high degree of ambiguity inherent in the three task domains reported on in 
this paper. For example, the AOC exercise placed team members in a time-compressed situation 
that required the operators to process a large amount of information from various intelligence 
sensors. Team members engaged in building their individual knowledge by asking lots of 
questions to continue to build on their existing knowledge and to maintain situation awareness in 
this dynamic environment. Similar results, where teams rely heavily on Individual Information 
Gathering and Team Information Exchange have been reported for several tasks including the 
Fire Department of New York responding o the events of Sept 11, 2001 (Hutchins & Kendall, 
2008) and air warfare decision making in the combat information center of Navy ships (Hutchins 
& Kendall, in press).  




Macrocognitive Process Categories 
 
 
Percentage of Speech Turns 
 
Individual Knowledge Building AOC NORAD UAV Plan’g
IIG Individual Information Gathering 21.93 30.91 32.57 
IIS Individual Information Synthesis 3.63 1.74 0.75 
KOB Knowledge Object Development 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Team Knowledge Building 
 
  
TIE Team Information Exchange 51.45 52.87 58.00 
TKS Team Knowledge Sharing 10.33 3.74 4.29 
TSOG Team Solution Option Generation 0.90 3.07 0.00 
TENA Team Evaluation and Negotiation of Alternatives 0.49 0.00 0.00 
TPPR Team Process and Plan Regulation 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Internalized Team Knowledge 
 
 
ITK Team Knowledge Similarity 0.08 0.00 0.00 
TKR Team Knowledge Resources 0.16 0.00 0.00 
IK Inter-positional Knowledge (3) 0.06 0.20 0.00 
ISA Individual Situational Awareness (1) 0.00 1.67 0.00 
 
Externalized Team Knowledge 
 
 
ECSA Externalized Cue-Strategy Association 0.49 0.07 0.00 
PRTA Pattern Recognition and Trend Analysis 0.16 0.07 0.00 
UR Uncertainty Resolution 0.08 0.13 0.00 
 
Problem Solving Outcomes 
 
 
QOP Quality of Plan 0.00 0.00      0.00  
EPP Efficiency of Planning Process 0.00 0.00      0.00  
EPE Efficiency of Planning Execution 0.00 0.00      0.00  
 
Decision to Take Action 
 
 
DTA DTA (Issue Course of Action) 6.61 4.27      0.00  







The high Kappa Cohen coefficient achieved by both pairs of coders indicates the two coder’s 
agreement is substantial (Landis and Koch, 1977). The high inter-rater reliability kappa score 
indicates the macrocognitive process definitions used by the coders are objective. There is also 
evidence that most of the macrocognitive processes in this model of team collaboration are 
applicable to real world decision making domains. 
  
Table 3 presents the results of the Kappa analysis, for the AOC data, in the form of a pivot table 
which compares coder 1 codes against coder 2 codes. Coder 1 codes are displayed in the 
columns and coder 2 codes are read across rows.  Coder matches run diagonally through the 
pivot table, in the bolded cells, starting with Administrative 183, Miscellaneous 663, Team 
Information Exchange 1134, and so on. The pivot table also highlights which codes the coders 
disagreed upon. For example, under the individual information gathering (IIG) category, coder 1 
and coder 2 had assigned a total of 537 and 526 IIG codes, respectively, to the data. However, 
both coders matched selections for 521 of the individual information gathering (IIG) codes. 
There were 16 and five instances, respectively, where coder 1 and coder 2 disagreed with the 
other coder. Reading down the column under IIG one sees that coder 1 had applied five 
individual information gathering (IIG) codes, one each for team knowledge sharing (TKS), 
Course of Action (COA), request take action (RTA) and applied eight ECF codes. Similarly for 
coder 2, of the five codes that differed between the two coders for IIG, two each were coded as 
ADMIN, and team information exchange (TIE), and one team knowledge sharing (TKS). 
 
In Table 3, the diagonal cells of the matrix indicate agreement between the coders whereas the 
values in the other cells indicate the difference between what each of the coders chose. As an 
example, in the pivot table, both raters agreed 1134 times on TIE, where coder 1 applied this 
code 1,192 times, to 58 additional utterances and coder 2 applied it 1187 times, or to 53 
additional utterances.  
When there was a disagreement on Team Information Exchange (TIE) or Team Knowledge 
Sharing (TKS) codes, the other code typically selected code was Team Knowledge Sharing and 
Team Information Exchange (respectively).  Reading down the pivot table for category TIE, one 
sees the number of agreed upon Team Information Exchange codes is 1,134 and that coder 2 
disagreed with coder 1 and selected Team Knowledge Similarity 17 times.  Additionally, reading 
down Team Knowledge Sharing (TKS) category, both coders agreed 136 times but coder 2 
disagreed and selected Team Information Exchange 24 times. The disagreement between TKS 
and TIE and the patterned alternative response of the other coder code indicates that there is 
some ambiguity in the measurement model definition for both of these macrocognitive 
processes. Furthermore, when coder 1 selected Team Information Exchange and Team 
Knowledge Sharing, coder 2 disagreed and selected the Extra Code Filler (ECF) code 20 and 39 
times (respectively). This disagreement between coders and non selection of macrocognitive 
process definition indicates that the definitions for Team Knowledge Sharing and Team 
Information Exchange need to be refined to clarify remove any ambiguity.   
 
Cases where there are large disagreements between two coders indicate the definitions for the 
macrocognitive process are not mutually exclusive and these definitions need to be refined. For 
example, the two coders agreed on 136 codes for team knowledge sharing (TKS) where coder 1 
applied TKS a total of 209 times and coder 2 applied TKS 172 times. Looking across the row 
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labeled TKS one can see the other codes that were applied to utterances by coder 2 when coder 1 
applied TKS. There were seventeen instances where coder 2 used team information exchange 
(TIE) instead of team knowledge sharing (TKS).   
 





























































ADMIN 183 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 185 
MISC 0 663 6 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 670 
TIE 0 1 1134 5 9 1 24 9 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 1187 
IIG 2 0 2 521 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 526 
IIS 0 0 4 0 23 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 
ECSA 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
TKS 0 0 17 1 6 1 136 3 0 3 3 1 0 1 0 172 
COA 0 0 4 1 0 0 1 138 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 149 
RTA 0 0 4 1 0 0 1 0 78 0 0 0 0 0 3 87 
TSOG 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 6 1 0 0 0 0 11 
TENA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 4 
ITK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 
UR  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PRTA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ECF 0 2 20 8 33 4 39 3 2 6 5 2 1 2 0 127 
Total Code
1 185 666 1192 537 72 12 209 154 81 19 12 6 1 4 8 3158 
 
Table 4 presents an excerpt of individual knowledge building from the Air Operations Center 
dynamic targeting scenario that includes several instances of individual information gathering, 
individual information synthesis, and team information exchange. 
Table 4. Individual Knowledge Building: Examples from Air Operations Center. 
 
Individual Knowledge Building 
Originator Communication Code 
  C2DO   SIDO: I missed the name of the airfield? IIG 
  C2DO   SIDO: Type of aircraft we are looking for and its latitude and longitude?  IIG 
  SODO   Command control duty officer (C2DO), what is the capability to track STOL  
  Cargo aircraft with (Tac C2)? 
IIG 
  SIDO   C2DO, STOL cargo aircraft has departed to the target; may operate between 44   
  and 200 knots. 
IIS 
  IOT   NTI: What can you tell me about bomb supplier #1? IIG 
  NTI   Information operations targeteer, bomb supplier #1 is a known materials supplier;   
  communication on cover and will report any new intelligence when available. 
IIS/ 
TIE 
C2C0:  Command and Control Officer SODO: Special Operations Duty Officer 
SIDO: Senior Intelligence Duty Officer IOT: Information Operations Targeteer 
14 
 
Team Knowledge Building 
 
Team Knowledge Building includes actions taken by team members to disseminate and transform 
information into actionable knowledge. To be effective in the highly dynamic environment of 
time-sensitive targeting, AOC team members must be ready to make rapid decisions for difficult 
problems in a time-compressed environment. The data indicate team members engaged in a large 
percentage of information sharing to keep all team members aware of the evolving situation. 
Table 5 provides examples of team information exchange where team members discussed the 
effects of radiological fallout from a possible strike against a building. They also provided an 
alternate solution option – team solution option generation (TSOG). Team Knowledge Building 
is essential to develop and maintain team situation awareness that provides the foundation for 
informed decision making.   
Table 5. Team Knowledge Building: Team Information Exchange Example. 
Team Knowledge Building:  
Team Information Exchange and Solution Option Generation 
Originator Communication Code 
  DEC   Awaiting radiological impact assessment on watershed if the building is to be strike. 
  Second option in work is to destroy local roads to prevent access in/out. 
TIE 
TSOG 
  DECD   Aircraft returns watershed non-issue TIE 
  SIDO   Airfield is located at (*Removed*); type of aircraft is STOL cargo plane. TIE/TIE 
  JOC_JCE   Dynamic effects cell, you have high-value target on your dynamic target list.  What  
  is the air combat commander game plan?  If you have a good one, I will appoint you 
  the lead but I think SOF needs to be considered. 
TIE 
IIG 
DEC:  Dynamic Effects Cell  DEDC:  Dynamic Effects Cell Deputy  JOC_JCEE: Joint Operations Center  
 
A total of 63.17, 59.58, and 62.29 percent, respectively, of the team communications for the AOC, 
NORAD, and UAV tasks, were coded as one of the macrocognitive processes that occur during the 
Team Knowledge Building Stage. Macrocognitive processes that were used by the team include 
Team Information Exchange (TIE), Team Knowledge Sharing (TKS), Team Solution Option 
Generation (TSOG), and Team Evaluation and Negotiation of Alternatives (TENA). The first entry 
in Table 5 provides an example of team information exchange, “Awaiting radiological impact 
assessment on watershed if the building is to be strike,” followed by an example of Team Solution 
Option Generation, “Second option in work is to destroy local roads to prevent access in/out. Table 
6 presents an excerpt from the AOC chat log data that illustrates team members sharing information 
on rules of engagement and discussing the effects of a strike mission against an airfield.   
Table 6. Macrocognitive Processes during Team Knowledge Building Stage of Collaboration. 
 
Team Knowledge Building  
Originator Communication Code 
  DEC   Self defense applies for hostile acts from Country #3 fighters in Country # 2 or #4 airspace. TKS 
  DEC   Enemy forces that employ ordnance, electronic attack or achieve a radar lock  
  against friendly forces have committed a hostile act 
TKS 
 
  TDO   If we crater the runway and taxiways, we may be able to effectively stop the target. TSOG
  IOT   Target Duty Officer (TDO): Just throwing this out there, but if you target the roadways, is  
  there a chance you could spook them and they might fire off their missiles and run? 
TENA




Externalized Team Knowledge 
 
Externalized Team Knowledge refers to knowledge that has been agreed upon by members of the 
team. Table 7 presents examples of the macrocognitive processes employed during the 
Externalized Team Knowledge stage from the AOC data. Externalized Cue-Strategy Associations 
(ECSA) describe the team’s collective agreement as to their task strategies and the situational 
cues that modify those strategies (and how). An example of this is found in the first entry of 
Table 7, where the operator says, “The dynamic effects cell chief stated that if there is an erect 
launcher in a joint special operations area (JSOA) his rules of engagement (ROE) are to kill it as 
soon as possible and if there is time, to de-conflict with the teams.” An example of Uncertainty 
Resolution (UR) is found in #6, Table 7, where the Joint Special Operations Force Targeteer 
says: “TLAMs most definitely have to be de-conflicted even for over flight of the JSOA, unless 
directed otherwise by the JFC.”     
 
Pattern Recognition and Trend Analysis (PRTA) refers to the accuracy of the patterns or trends 
explicitly noted by members of a team that is either agreed upon or unchallenged by other team 
members. A member of the dynamic effects cell provides an example of PRTA, entry #7, with 
the following: “Looks like this target may be similar to our first target with regards to unknown 
presence of radiological containers in facility.  We would look at interdiction for containment to 
prevent travel to/from that site, your thoughts on best plan/option.”  
Table 7. Examples of Externalized Team Knowledge from Air Operations Center Data. 
 
 Externalized Team Knowledge 
No. Originator Communication Code 
1. DECSOLE   The dynamic effects cell chief stated that if there is an erect launcher in a joint  
  Special operations area (JSOA) his rules of engagement (ROE) are to kill it as soon 
  as possible and if there is time, to de-conflict with the teams. 
ECSA 
2. JSOFT   Correct, if per joint force commander (JFC) TIE 
3. DECSOLE   I can't remember ROE in the west for OIF but I think it was something similar. TIE 
4. DECSOLE   He mentioned tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAM) wouldn't be de-conflicted  
  either, but I dispute that logic. First, we wouldn't use a TLAM to shot a launcher… 
  I don't think. Unless it was a last resort. 
ECSA 
5. SECSOLE   Second the flight time is great enough to pass the warning and do the de- 
  confliction. 
TIE 
6. JSOFT   TLAMs most definitely have to be de-conflicted even for over flight of the JSOA,  
  unless directed otherwise by the JFC.  He's not the JFC.  If any issues, let me know  
  and I'll pass up to the joint special operation task force commander for discussion 
  with the JFC. 
UR/ 
ECSA 
7. DEC   Looks like this target may be similar to our first target with regards to unknown  
  presence of Radiological containers in facility.  We would look at interdiction for  
  containment to prevent travel to/fm that site, your thoughts on best plan/option 
PRTA 
DECSOLE:  Dynamic Effects Cell Special Operations Liaison Officer 
JSOFT: Joint Special Operations Force Targeteer 
SECSOLE: Special Operations Liaison Officer   DEC:  Dynamic Effects Cell 
 
Table 8 presents an example of how information was shared as a series of team information 
exchanges (TIE) and individual information gathering (IIG). That is, requests for information 
were integrated and lead Huntress to decide on a major course of action, without solving the 
overall problem. Specifically, Team Information Exchange led to Individual Information 
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Gathering, which led to Decision to Take Action (Course of Action), “Intercept. Intercept. We 
want the aircraft away from there,” and then the problem continues. 
Table 8. Excerpt from NEADS data to illustrate the Dynamic Decision-Making Process.  
DISCUSSION 
Line Speaker Message Code 
702 Male Speaker: Sergeant Demage?   MISC 
    We are working a tanker.   TIE 
703 Sergeant M: There is a bomb on board Boston - TIE 
704 Male Speaker: *Expletive* MISC 
705 Male Speaker: On board what?  Boston 93?   IIG 
706 Huntress: United. TIE 
707 Male Speaker: United? IIG 
708 Sergeant M: Bomb on board United 93. TIE 
709 Huntress: Intercept.  Intercept.  We want the aircraft away from there. DTA (COA) 
 
 
A new macrocognitive process emerged during coding. Decision to Take Action (DTA) is 
considered to be both a macrocognitive process and a product (Klein, 1993). This finding 
indicates a non-exhaustive set of macrocognitive processes in the model of team collaboration. 
These results corroborate results from other analyses based on analysis and coding transcripts 
from other dynamic decision-making tasks (Hutchins & Kendall, in press; Hutchins & Kendall, 
2008). For example, in a 30-minute air warfare scenario, nine decisions to take action were made 
by the air warfare team.  Moreover, nineteen percent of the team communications from the Fire 
Department of New York responding to the Sept 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center 
involved decisions to take action. 
Coding schemes should be mutually exclusive, exhaustive, and equivalent. The high Cohen 
Kappa coefficient indicates the two coder’s agreement is substantial and indicates the macrocog-
nitive process definitions are objective. The pivot table of results highlights instances where the 
two coders disagreed and shows which codes were used by the other coder when there were 
disagreements. Disagreements indicate macrocognitive processes that are not mutually exclusive. 
Definitions for some macrocognitive processes may need to be refined to remove ambiguity. 
Planning tasks can also trigger decisions to take action. One example involves flight planning by 
an air crew. The crew may have a discussion regarding the weather and then arrive at a DTA in 
the form of deciding to change the route, altitude, amount of fuel, or even the destination. These 
are critical decisions as a wrong decision could have an unfavorable outcome. Moreover, these 
decisions are sometimes modified over the course of the flight as new information is gathered 
and evaluated.  In the UAV example reported in the results section, there were several DTAs.    
At this time our working hypothesis is the more a task or problem entails dynamic decision 
making the higher the number of DTAs will be required.  We plan to test this hypothesis with 
analysis of additional tasks from several decision-making and planning task domains.  We 
anticipate planning tasks will entail less DTAs; one reason is that planning does not include tasks 
that require dynamic decisions – unless the task entails dynamic planning/re-planning while 
executing the task. The traditional planning process, where planning for the task is performed 
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prior to execution, is somewhat static in that the situation does not change. A planning task 
generally entails a finite set of decisions in contrast to the many emergent decisions that arise in 
dynamic decision-making situations.  The state of the world changes during dynamic decision-
making situations but not during planning and perhaps this is the biggest difference between 
planning and execution. During execution tasks decisions are made in real time and must be 
made in the correct moment in time, whereas time is not really a factor in planning.   
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Decision to Take Action is recommended as a new category to be added to the set of 
macrocognitive processes included in the Fiore, Smith-Jentsch, Salas, Warner, and Letsky (in 
press) model of team collaboration. Deciding to take action is viewed as both a macrocognitive 
process and a product of team collaboration. We maintain that decision making is a critical 
element of team problem solving when a team is executing a task, and to a lesser degree when 
conducting a planning task. When team members collaborate to solve a problem they make 
decisions and implement those decisions as part of performing the task. Team communications 
often entail asking or telling a team member to perform some action that will move the problem 
further along toward completion. This contrasts with a team who is collaborating on a planning 
task, where deciding on and implementing decisions may not be evident. This is the case for 
problem-solving domains in the military, government, and the private sectors. For example, we 
predict this same pattern would be evident for a surgical team, a humanitarian assistance 
scenario, a process control system for an energy plant, and a variety of other task domains. 
 
Decision Making is Part of Problem-Solving  
  
Many critical tasks that involve team problem solving include decision making; that is, team 
members take action in addition to developing new knowledge and agreeing on a final solution. 
Actions are frequently part of the overall information gathering process and have diagnostic 
functions (Orasanu & Connolly, 1993; Orasanu & Fischer, 1997). For the task domains discussed 
here, a constant interplay exists between sharing information – to develop new knowledge and 
maintain situation awareness – and deciding on actions, and implementing these actions, 
followed by monitoring the situation and continuing to build new knowledge on the unfolding 
situation. Execution of the mission, or problem-solving task, would come to a screeching halt 
without this continual, iterative cycle of developing knowledge of the situation and responding to 
the current situation.  
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